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Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between premia for macroeconomic risk
in banking, aggregate behavior, and banking crises. We consider a competitive
banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject to re-
peated macroeconomic shocks. We highlight how risk premia decline when bank
equity decreases and identify potential vicious circles that may lead to banking
crises.
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1 Introduction
Severe banking crises can cause substantial damage to an economy. Most studies have
shown that the costs of banking crises in terms of GDP losses may become very high, see
e.g., Caprio & Klingebiel (1997), Lindgren, Garcia & Saal (1996), Caprio & Honohan
(1999), or Peter (1999). Why such crises occur and how they can be prevented has
therefore occupied policy-makers and researchers around the world.
Complementary to the more traditional microeconomic literature, this paper provides
a dynamic macroeconomic perspective on the causes of banking crises and the need for
regulation in banking systems. We discuss an overlapping generations model, in which
financial intermediaries solve agency problems between saving agents and investing
entrepreneurs by economizing on transaction costs in financial contracting. In each pe-
riod, the productivity of entrepreneurs is subject to macroeconomic shocks. Banks can
freely enter or exit, which determines the risk premium that banks require for bearing
macroeconomic risks. In the absence of intermediation costs, the risk premium is equal
to the spread between loan and deposit rates. The economic system is connected over
time through intertemporal savings decisions and through transfer of bank ownership
and thus bank capital across generations.
We identify dynamic vicious circles that can lead to the default of the banking system.
These circles occur despite the fact that banks earn fair premia for macroeconomic
risks. An initial downward spiral starts when negative macroeconomic shocks cause a
substantial decline in bank capital. Consequently risk premia decline, since the leverage
of banks increases and limited liability allows banks to earn sufficient returns on equity,
even with small premia for macroeconomic risks. Declining risk premia then increase
the risk of a further decline of bank capital, which would entail a further reduction
of risk premia. At the limit when bank capital approaches zero, the risk premium
vanishes. Overall, an initial negative macroeconomic shock can lead to a downward
spiral of bank capital, which results in a default of the banking system.
In extensions of the model further feedback effects can be identified, which operate
through wages, savings, and deposits. A negative macroeconomic shock lowers the
marginal product of labor and hence wages decline, which, in turn, lowers the supply
of deposits. Such a decline increases the average quality of borrowers and lowers the
leverage of banks, thereby causing higher risk premia. This tends to counteract the
decline of bank capital. However, if banks need to refinance themselves during the
fruition time of investment, it may either be impossible to satisfy liquidity needs, or
aggregate investment will drop substantially, increasing the likelihood of a default of
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the banking system.
The results of this paper suggest that a competitive banking system subject to repeated
macroeconomic shocks has great difficulties in protecting itself against defaults. This
may justify banking regulation that interferes when bank capital is declining too much
or tries to remove macroeconomic risk from the balance sheet of banks.1
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief account of
two approaches to model banking crises. Then we present the model. In Section 4
we introduce financial intermediation and risk premia. In Section 5 we identify bank
capital crises. In Section 6 we discuss dynamic feedbacks operating through wages and
deposits. Section 7 concludes.
2 Two Approaches to Banking Crises
The literature offers two perspectives on how banking crises can occur. Firstly, a wealth
of research has concentrated on bank runs. At the origin of this is the work of Diamond
(1984). Recent contributions by Chen (1999) and by Allen & Gale (2004) show how
banking panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are low.
Runs may be inefficient, as in Chen, or first-best efficient, as in Allen and Gale.
A second type of bank crisis can be termed ‘bank capital crisis’. It is the focus of
this paper. In a bank capital crises a series of negative macroeconomic shocks leads
to a decline of bank capital. This may trigger a downward spiral in bank capital since
premia for macroeconomic risks tend to decline along with declining capital. As soon as
banks are no longer able to repay their depositors, the banking system has insufficient
capital to carry out intermediation services for future generations and defaults. This is
called a bank capital crisis. The model presented in this paper allows for bank capital
crisis. Bank runs cannot occur, since deposit contracts last for one period only and
there is no maturity mismatch between deposits and loans. An important task in the
future will be to combine bank runs and bank capital crises.
A major assumption underlying our model is that banking crises are caused by macroe-
conomic downturns. Gorton (1988) and subsequent work by Gonza´lez-Hermosillo,
Pazarbas¸iog˘lu, and Billings (1997), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Detragiache (1998) suggest that banking crises tend to erupt when the macroeco-
nomic environment is weak, particularly when output growth is low. These empirical
1A more detailed discussion of the policy measures designed to counteract these vicious circles is
given in Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2001).
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facts are consistent with our modeling assumption that negative output shocks may
cause a default of the banking system.
Our macroeconomic perspective is complementary to that of Blum & Hellwig (1995),
who have shown that strict capital adequacy rules may reinforce macroeconomic fluc-
tuations. In our model, the dynamic feedback between competition of banks and
financial fragility is responsible for the vulnerability of a competitive banking system
to repeated macroeconomic shocks. Our approach belongs to the tradition of aggre-
gate models with financial intermediation initiated by Williamson (1987) and Uhlig
(1995). The innovative aspect is a model in which the banking system is subject to
repeated macroeconomic shocks and in which free exit and entry determines premia
for macroeconomic risks.
3 The Model
We use an overlapping generations model with financial intermediation, in which agents
live for two periods. Time is infinite in the forward direction and divided into discrete
periods indexed by t. There is one physical good that can be used for consumption
or investment. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents with two-period
lives, indexed by [0, 1]. Each individual of each generation receives an endowment e
of goods when young and none when old. The endowment may be the output from
short-term production with inelastically supplied labor. Generations are divided into
two classes. A fraction η of the individuals are potential entrepreneurs, the rest 1− η
of the population are consumers. Potential entrepreneurs and consumers differ in that
only the former have access to investment projects.
Consumers are endowed with preferences on consumption in the two periods of their
lives. Let u(c1t , c
2
t ) be a standard intertemporal utility function of a consumer, with
c1t , c
2
t denoting youthful and old-age consumption respectively of a consumer born in
period t.2 Given an endowment e when young and a deposit interest rate rd, each
young household saves the amount s(rd).
Each entrepreneur has access to a production project that converts period-t goods into
period-t + 1 goods. For simplicity, we assume that potential entrepreneurs are risk-
neutral and consume only when old. e + I are the funds required for an investment
project. An entrepreneur must borrow I units of the goods in order to undertake
2In view of the applications, it is straightforward to replace the OG structure by infinitely living
agents who optimize myopically.
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the investment project. The entrepreneurs are heterogeneous and indexed by a quality
parameter i which is uniformly distributed on [0, η]. If an entrepreneur of type i obtains
additional resources I and decides to invest, his investment returns in the next period
amount to
fi(q, e + I) = q (1 + i)f(e + I),
where f denotes a standard atemporal neoclassical production function. The parameter
q ∈ R+ is subject to exogenous stochastic noise governed by an iid process on a compact
interval [q, q].
Entrepreneurs are price takers and operate under limited liability. Under the assump-
tion that they will not be credit-rationed at banks, all entrepreneurs applying for a
loan contract randomly choose a bank that offers intermediation services. Given a loan
interest rate rc, the expected profit of an investing entrepreneur i is
Π(i, rc) :=
∫
R+
max{(1 + i)q f(e + I)− I(1 + rc), 0}µ(dq), (1)
where µ denotes the probability distribution of the shocks. Note that Π(i, rc) is mono-
tonically increasing in quality levels i and decreasing in loan rates rc. To obtain a loan
contract of size I, entrepreneurs are required to invest all of their equity e. They face a
binary decision problem, such that a risk-neutral entrepreneur with quality parameter
i ∈ [0, η] will invest if
Π(i, rc) ≥ e (1 + rd). (2)
4 Financial Intermediation
At the heart of this paper is the question to what extent a perfectly competitive bank-
ing system with free entry and exit is vulnerable to banking crises. Suppose to this
end that there are n (n > 1) identical banks, indexed by j = 1, . . . , n, owned by
entrepreneurs. Banks finance entrepreneurs and maximize profits accruing to current
shareholders. Transfer of bank ownership to the next generation occurs through be-
quests. We assume that the number of banks is large and that the banking industry
is perfectly competitive, i.e., banks take deposit and loan rates as given. Moreover,
banks freely decide whether or not to offer their intermediation services.
Each bank j can sign deposit contracts D(rd), where 1 + rd is the repayment offered
for 1 unit of resources. Loan contracts of bank j are denoted by C(rc), while 1 + rc is
the repayment required from entrepreneurs for 1 unit of funds. All deposits and loan
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contracts last for one period. Banks act as delegated monitors, since depositors can nei-
ther observe the quality of investment projects, nor are aware of whether entrepreneurs
invest or consume their funds. It is assumed that banks are able to secure both the
investment of entrepreneurs who have obtained a loan and the liquidation value in the
case of default. There are various ways to formulate moral hazard and monitoring
technologies justifying this assumption. Detailed justifications for the current model
set-up are provided in Gersbach & Uhlig (2004) and Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2001).
We see from (2) that banks do not have to fear low-quality entrepreneurs applying for
loans, as they are always better off with saving endowments.
4.1 Sequence of Events
We introduce intermediation that takes place within each period. The time-line of
actions in the economy within a typical period t is as follows:
1. Old entrepreneurs pay back with limited liability. The current level of bank
capital is determined. Positive bank capital is distributed among shareholders
according to payout rules.
2. Given rd and rc, banks decide whether to exit and to save their equity. Banks
that stay in business offer their intermediation services.
3. Consumers and entrepreneurs decide which contracts to accept. Resources are
exchanged and banks pay back old depositors.
4. Young entrepreneurs produce subject to a macroeconomic shock.
In order to simplify the exposition, we set the costs of intermediation at zero.3 We make
the following assumptions regarding the behavior of banks. Banks operate under lim-
ited liability. Depositors randomly choose a bank that offers its intermediation services
in order to save. Similarly, entrepreneurs applying for a loan contract choose banks
randomly. Throughout the paper we assume that aggregate uncertainty is canceled out
when depositors and entrepreneurs randomly choose banks, that is, each active bank
obtains the same amount of deposits and loans.4
Loans are constrained by the amount of deposits obtained. If entrepreneurs applying
for loans are rejected, they will randomly choose a bank and save their endowment.
3Such costs would include the monitoring expenses of banks. If intermediation costs per loan were
fixed, the spread rc − rd in equilibrium would increase accordingly for all of our results.
4The exact construction of individual randomness ensuring that this statement holds can be found
in Alos-Ferrer (1999).
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4.2 Temporary Equilibria
In order to derive the intermediation equilibrium, we assume that savings are never
sufficient to fund all entrepreneurs, so that
S(rd) = (1− η) s(rd) < η I for all rd ≥ 0.
Let d denote the current capital base of the banking system. An individual bank has an
amount of equity of dj =
d
n
. As all banks are assumed to be identical we will formulate
the equilibrium conditions for the whole banking system and hence focus directly on
the evolution of the aggregate bank capital d.
There are two boundary values for d. Let Smax := max{S(r
d) : rd ≥ 0} denote
maximal aggregate savings and set d := ηI − Smax > 0 as an upper bound for the
capital bases. If d > d, we assume that banks pay excess reserves to bank owners
according to pay-out rules. On the other hand, if d ≤ 0, then the capital base of the
banking system has vanished, causing a default of the system.
For these reasons, the intermediation problem arises only when d ∈ (0, d]. For each
d ∈ (0, d] and each rd ≥ 0 there exists a unique critical entrepreneur iG ∈ [0, η], given
by
iG = iG(d, r
d) :=
ηI − S(rd)− d
e + I
, (3)
such that savings are balanced by investments, that is,
S(rd) + e iG(d, r
d) + d =
[
η − iG(d, r
d)
]
I, d ∈ (0, d]. (4)
Let d ∈ (0, d] be the current level of bank capital at the beginning of an arbitrary
period. Banks raise funds S(rd)+ e iG(d, r
d) that have to be paid back with interest at
the end of the subsequent period. In a competitive equilibrium, these funds will have
to satisfy (4).
Banks lend
[
η− iG
]
I to firms and will receive payments P = P
(
iG, q, r
c
)
at the end of
the period, given by
P
(
iG, q, r
c
)
=
∫ η
iG
min
{
(1 + i)q f(e + I) , I
(
1 + rc
)}
di, (5)
where iG = iG(d, r
d). Given a pair of interest rates rd, rc, profits of the banking system
are given by a function G(·, q, rd, rc) : (0, d] → R, defined by
G(d, q, rd, rc) = P
(
iG(d, r
d), q, rc
)
−
[
S(rd) + e iG(d, r
d)
]
(1 + rd), (6)
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such that for each shock q and each rc, rd ≥ 0, G(d, q, rd, rc) is the capital base of the
banking system at the end of the period.
Suppose d > 0. A temporary equilibrium with financial intermediation in a particular
period is a pair of interest rates
(
rd
∗
, rc
∗
)
such that
(i) no bank exits and no bank enters the market;
(ii) firms take optimal investment and saving decisions;
(iii) loan demand equals loan supply.
Writing
G+(d, q, rd, rc) = max
{
G(d, q, rd, rc), 0
}
,
the expected profit of banks for interest rates rc, rd that operate under limited li-
ability is E
[
G+(d, q, rd, rc)
]
. More formally, a temporary equilibrium with financial
intermediation is defined as follows:
Definition 1
Let d ∈ (0, d] denote the capital base of the banking system operating under limited
liability. A temporary equilibrium with financial intermediation (TEFI) is a pair of
interest rates (rd
∗
, rc
∗
) such that the following conditions hold:
E
[
G+(d, · , rd
∗
, rc
∗
)
]
= d (1 + rd
∗
) (7)
Π
(
iG(d, r
d
∗
), rc
∗
)
= e (1 + rd
∗
) (8)
S(rd
∗
) + e iG(d, r
d
∗
) + d =
[
η − iG(d, r
d
∗
)
]
I (9)
Condition (7) is the no-exit and no-entry condition for banks. Of course, the condition
has to be applied to an individual bank. As the condition for an individual bank is
obtained by dividing both sides in equation (7) through the number of banks, it is
convenient to work directly with the aggregate condition as we will do throughout the
paper.
Condition (8) states that all entrepreneurs i ≥ iG(d, r
d
∗
) invest, while all entrepreneurs
i < iG(d, r
d
∗
) save. The spread rc
∗
− rd
∗
represents what the banks obtain for bearing
macroeconomic risks. For the sake of completeness, the definition of TEFI includes (9),
stating that aggregate demand for loans
[
η− iG(d, r
d
∗
)
]
I is balanced by loan supply on
the left hand side of equation (9).
Condition (9) determines the critical investing entrepreneur iG(d, r
d
∗
) independently of
equilibrium loan interest rates. Assuming that aggregate saving S(rd) is increasing in
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rd, we see that iG is decreasing in d and r
d. In both cases more resources are available,
which encourages entrepreneurs with lower quality levels to invest. This is the case
despite the fact that saving endowment becomes more attractive for increasing deposit
interest rates rd.
4.3 Existence of Temporary Equilibria and Risk Premia
Let us briefly discuss the existence of temporary equilibria and identify the role of the
risk premia.
PSfrag replacements
45◦
rc
rd
rc
∗
(d)
rd
∗
(d)
Condition (7)
Condition (8)
Figure 1: Existence and uniqueness of a TEFI for a given d ∈ (0, d].
The existence of a TEFI is illustrated in Figure 1. For an arbitrary capital base
d ∈ (0, d], the figure depicts two curves. One of them describes all pairs of interest
rates satisfying the no-entry condition (7), the other one all pairs of interest rates
satisfying the indifference condition (8). A TEFI is characterized by the intersection
point of these two curves. TEFI exist since savings and loan supply increase with
the deposit interest rate, while the demand for loans depends negatively on the loan
interest rate. In equilibrium, the spread rc
∗
− rd
∗
is the premium for the macroeconomic
risk. By setting an appropriate spread rc
∗
− rd
∗
banks earn returns on equity that are
just high enough to ensure that there is no incentive to exit or to enter. As indicated
in the figure, it is intuitively clear that risk premia must be positive. This fact along
with a formal existence and uniqueness proof is rigorously established in Gersbach &
Wenzelburger (2004).
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5 Declining Bank Capital
The dynamic behavior of the economy is described by the evolution of capital in the
banking system. Let dt ∈ (0, d] denote the capital base of the banking system at
the beginning of some period t, where we allow the banking system to start with an
arbitrary level d0 ∈ (0, d]. At the beginning of period t, banks raise funds S
(
rd
∗
(dt)
)
+
e iG
(
dt, r
d
∗
(dt)
)
that have to be paid back with interest at the end of that period. Writing
i∗(dt) := iG
(
dt, r
d
∗
(dt)
)
for the critical entrepreneur in a competitive equilibrium, these
funds must satisfy
S
(
rd
∗
(dt)
)
+ e i∗(dt) + dt = I
[
η − i∗(dt)
]
, dt ∈ (0, d]. (10)
The corresponding equilibrium interest rates are rc
∗
(dt), r
d
∗
(dt). For a given shock qt,
the new level of bank capital dt+1 is determined by
dt+1 = min
{
G∗
(
dt, qt
)
, d
}
, dt ∈ (0, d], (11)
where the map G∗ is defined as follows. Using the definition for the profit of the
banking system (6), the function G?(·, q) : (0, d] → (−∞, d] for each q is defined by
G∗(d, q) := G
(
d, q, rd
∗
(d), rc
∗
(d)
)
= P
(
i∗(d), q, r
c
∗
(d)
)
−
[
S
(
rd
∗
(d)
)
+ e i∗(d)
] (
1 + rd
∗
(d)
)
.
Note that we account for the fact that excess capital above d will be distributed among
old entrepreneurs only. Thus possible dividend payments will neither affect savings nor
investment decisions.
The map (11) is continuous in both arguments and describes a random difference
equation. Since {qt}t∈N is an iid process, the sequence of bank capital levels {dt}t∈N
generated by (11) is a Markov process. If dt+1 ≥ 0, then all depositors have been repaid
and dt+1 represents the capital level of the banking system at the beginning of period
t+1. If dt+1 < 0, then the banks incur losses, and dt+1 is the amount of liabilities that
could not be covered by loan repayments of entrepreneurs. In such a case, the banking
system has negative equity and is bankrupt.
The first vicious circle arises from a dynamic feedback between risk premia and bank
capital. Our main result is as follows:
Theorem 1
Suppose that for each d ∈ (0, d) there is positive probability that no entrepreneur will
go bankrupt. Then the risk premia will vanish with a vanishing capital base, that is,
lim
d→0
[
rc
∗
(d)− rd
∗
(d)
]
= 0.
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Theorem 1 has important implications.5 If a banking system has lost most of its
capital, the risk premia decline, hence the risk of a further decline of bank capital
increases. At the limit where bank capital approaches zero, the risk premium vanishes.
In order to explain this result, we observe that for a low level of bank capital a positive
risk premium implies a very large return on equity ex post for sufficiently favorable
macroeconomic shocks since no entrepreneur will go bankrupt. As very adverse shocks
may imply at most zero equity, a small risk premium is sufficient to generate the ex
ante expected return on equity required by shareholders.
A consequence of Theorem 1 is that the probability of a default of the banking system
is positive if the capital base is below a certain threshold, which will be denoted by
dcrit. A level of bank capital below dcrit makes the banking system vulnerable to default
in two ways. First, the buffer against defaults of entrepreneurs is small. Second, the
risk premium is small, and even moderately adverse macroeconomic shocks may lead
to a further decline in bank capital.
Moreover, the banking system will default in finite time with the probability of one.
The argument is based upon the existence of a critical shock qcrit > q such that the
capital base will decrease for shocks below qcrit, i.e.,
G∗(d, q) < d for all d ∈ (0, d], q < qcrit.
Then a series of sufficiently numerous shocks qt, . . . , qt+τ below qcrit will lead to a chain
of decreasing capital bases
dt+1 = G∗(dt, qt) > · · · > dt+1+τ = G∗(dt+τ , qt+τ )
that will finally take on a value below zero, thus causing a default of the banking
system. Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2004) show that the event of default occurs with
probability one.
We summarize the underlying logic as follows. Repeated negative macroeconomic
shocks lower the equity of banks until it ultimately lies below the critical level dcrit.
Further negative macroeconomic shocks then lead to a downward spiral of bank capital.
As equity declines, the risk premium decreases, which in turn increases the probability
of further declines in bank capital. Over time, the banking system will default.
5Theorem 1 is formally proven in Gersbach & Wenzelburger (2004).
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6 Extensions: Labor Market and Maturity
The present model can be extended in two ways in order to capture important further
dynamic feedback effects from labor income, savings, and the supply of deposits. The
first extension is to incorporate labor as an input factor for production and thereby to
endogenize the endowment of individuals as wage income.
The essential extension of the model is outlined as follows. Both potential entrepreneurs
and consumers supply one unit of labor inelastically when young and receive wage
income wt−1 in period t−1. As before, consumers derive utility from consumption over
two periods of life and save for old-age consumption. The aggregate savings function
then depends both on the deposit rate and on the prevailing wage level. Aggregate
savings of consumers in period t− 1 take the form
st−1 = S(wt−1, r
d),
where rd is some deposit rate.
Each entrepreneur has access to a production possibility in his second period of life
and, as before, may either save or invest his funds. If he decides to invest, then his wage
income obtained when young et = wt−1 represents the equity available for production
in t. As before, the investment project requires an additional I units of physical capital,
which have to be borrowed from banks. These funds together with the equity will be
invested and will provide the physical capital for production in period t. The output
of an investing entrepreneur i ∈ [0, η] in period t is then produced from capital I + et
and labor input li. Given a loan interest rate rc and a wage rate w, the expected profit
function (1) of an investing entrepreneur i has to be changed to
Π(i, rc, w, li) :=
∫
R+
max{(1 + i)q f(et + I, l
i)− I(1 + rc)− wli, 0}µ(dq).
The notion of a temporary equilibrium given in Definition 1 will have to be extended
by imposing a market clearing condition for the labor market.
An extension of the model as outlined above includes additional feedback effects that
operate through wages, endowments, and deposits. Loosely speaking, it incorporates
a banking sector into a Diamond-type growth model. Adverse macroeconomic shocks
in period t will lead to low wages and low endowments and thus to low savings. Low
endowments of entrepreneurs make loans more risky, thus entailing an increase in the
downside risk for banks such that risk premia should increase as well. On the other
hand, low savings decrease the leverage of banks and increase the average quality of
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borrowers. The impact on risk premia is therefore ambiguous. It is an open issue
whether or not the overall impact of the wage feedback creates a further vicious circle
and increases the default risk of the banking system.
The second extension of the model needs to incorporate maturity transformation in the
following sense. Suppose that, in addition to the above extension, entrepreneurs and
consumers live for three periods. Then loans for entrepreneurs may be long-term, such
that a production project converts period-t goods into period-(t + 2) goods. In this
case, banks are forced to refinance themselves during the fruition time of investments.
Then a negative macroeconomic shock that lowers savings and the supply of deposits
is much more likely to initiate a downward spiral. As refinancing requires replacing
old depositors by younger ones, global resource constraints may either depress new
investments as deposits from the young generation decline, or even violate aggregate
liquidity constraints of the banking system. This may cause an immediate default of
the banking system. In summary, feedbacks from wages and deposit supplies are likely
to amplify adverse shocks and tend to increase the likelihood of a system-wide default.
7 Conclusion
The discussion in the present paper suggests that vulnerabilities of a banking system
may build up over time, creating the danger of large-scale defaults of banks. Apart
from potential policy implications, we hope that the current framework offers avenues
for further research. Two main research tasks are apparent. The most important task
in future research is to combine the type of banking crisis discussed in this paper with
the wealth of research on bank runs. The design of such a grand model allowing for
banks runs and bank capital crises is one of the main challenges in modeling banking
in a macroeconomic context.
At another level, one might ask whether it is possible to improve the protection of
banks from macroeconomic risks. The way in which securities and deposit and loan
contracts might be designed so as to reduce macroeconomic risks on the balance sheets
of banks appears to be one of the prominent research issues that we have attempted
to highlight in this paper.
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